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Product of the Mind: Idea Submission Cases
and Copyright Preemption Post-Grosso
Catherine Niebergall*
"[T]here are a thousand thoughts lying within a man that he does not
know till he takes up the pen to write." I-William Makepeace Thackeray,
The History Of Henry Esmond, Esq.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideas are a dime a dozen, but in Hollywood, this adage is a different
story since writers often submit their ideas and concepts to producers instead
of a copyrighted script. The Copyright Act of 1976 protects only concepts
and ideas that writers record in some tangible form, like a copyrighted
script.2 So, how does the legal system handle cases regarding "idea submis-
sion," or idea theft, when copyright laws do not apply? Similarly, what hap-
pens when a studio uses a writer's copyrighted script idea to produce a film
without physically acquiring any actual script from the writer?
Several courts, mostly from California and the Ninth Circuit, have held
that writers sometimes have rights to their intangible ideas under contract
law. The Supreme Court of California, in the seminal case Desny v. Wilder,
first held that writers enjoy an implied contractual right to compensation
when they submit material to producers with the understanding that the pro-
ducers will pay the writers for any subsequent use of the writers' ideas.3 The
Ninth Circuit adopted the Desny holding when deciding cases such as Grosso
v. Miramax Film Corporation, Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.,
and Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.4 The Second Circuit has only
recently started to address idea theft cases with Forest Park Pictures v. Uni-
versal Television Network, Inc.5
This comment addresses copyright preemption and the contractual right
to compensation in the area of idea submission cases. Part II explores the
practice of idea submission in the entertainment industry, the landmark
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2014; B.A., Political Science,
University of California, San Diego, 2009.
1. WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY, THE HISTORY OF HENRY ESMOND, ESQ.
158 (1852), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/thackeray/
henryesmond.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998).
3. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 277 (Cal. 1956) (en banc).
4. Id.; Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. (Montz 11), 649 F.3d 975 (9th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 550 (U.S. 2011); Benay v. Warner Bros.,
607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010); Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965
(9th Cir. 2004), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 400 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.
2005).
5. See Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424
(2d Cir. 2012).
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Desny case, and the actual use requirement, which determines the evidentiary
proof required for an idea theft claim.6 Part H also examines Section 301 of
the Copyright Act of 1976, which uses a two-prong test to determine copy-
right preemption of state contract claims.7 It concludes with an examination
of Grosso, another milestone case that held that the Copyright Act does not
preempt implied contract claims.8 Part I surveys the current state of idea
submission law, namely the three recent circuit court cases of Benay, Montz,
and Forest Park.9 It also analyzes how these cases affect idea submission
law. First, this section looks at the impact of Benay on the actual use require-
ment. 10 Second, it examines how Montz has expanded the definition of the
"extra element" test under the second prong of the Section 301 preemption
test.", Third, it reviews Forest Park's impact on the Second Circuit.12 Finally,
Part IV addresses the future of idea submission law, most notably if and
when the Supreme Court will hear an idea submission case.
II. HISTORY OF IDEA SUBMISSION CLAIMS
A. Idea Submission in the Entertainment Industry
The idea submission process is burdensome on writers, producers, and
studios within the entertainment industry. There are three ways that an idea
can make it to the silver screen in Hollywood.13 First, a producer may come
up with an original idea by himself and then turn that idea into a movie.'4
However, producers rarely come up with ideas themselves. 15 Second, an idea
may be submitted to a producer or studio through an agent.' 6 This is the most
common form of idea submission.7 Third, a writer can "pitch" an idea di-
rectly to a producer or his studio, but gaining direct access to a producer can
be difficult.18 Additionally, studios and networks are inundated with so many
6. Desny, 299 P.2d at 257.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998).
8. Grosso, 383 F.3d at 965.
9. Benay, 607 F.3d at 620; Montz, 649 F.3d at 975; Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 424.
10. Benay, 607 F.3d at 620.
11. Montz, 649 F.3d at 975.
12. Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 424.
13. Brian Devine, Comment, Free as the Air: Rethinking the Law of Story Ideas,
24 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 355, 363-64 (2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 363.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 363-64.
18. Id.
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unsolicited idea submissions that most refuse to accept such unsolicited man-
uscripts unless the writer signs a release beforehand.19
Typically, a writer presents his idea submission in the form of an out-
line, synopsis, or treatment. 20 A film treatment provides a general synopsis of
a writer's idea or script for a movie.21 Treatments normally range from eight
to fifteen pages, include three to five acts, and explain the important concep-
tual elements.22 Professional script readers usually review these film treat-
ments to evaluate their quality and possible commercial value before giving
the treatments to producers for further review.23 This process allows busy
producers to review submissions quickly rather than waste precious time on
meritless ideas.24
However, the main problem with this review process is that the Copy-
right Act of 1976 does not apply to idea submissions and thus, provides no
protection for writers' intellectual property. 25 Section 102 of the Copyright
Act limits the scope of copyrights to "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression," stating that "[i]n no case does copyright
protection ...extend to any idea, procedure, process . . . or discovery, re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work."26 Since federal copyright protection does not apply to film
treatments, outlines, and synopses under Section 102, state law sometimes
supplies the only potential means for writers to protect their concepts and
ideas.27 As the Ninth Circuit has explained,"[c]ontract law, whether through
express or implied-in-fact contracts, is the most significant remaining state-
law protection for literary or artistic ideas."28 For a writer to succeed on a
contract claim, he must prove the requisite elements of mutual assent, consid-
eration, and breach.29 However, federal copyright law plays an important role
in idea submission cases because of the potential for federal copyright law to
19. Devine, supra note 13, at 364.
20. Id.
21. Film Treatments: How to Write a Film Treatment, LIGHTS FILM SCHOOL, http://




24. Devine, supra note 13, at 364.
25. See id. at 365.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
27. Devine, supra note 13, at 365.
28. Benay, 607 F.3d at 629.
29. Devine, supra note 13, at 367 (citing Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties,
Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 376 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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preempt state contract claims under the Supremacy Clause.30 Therefore, in
cases where copyright law preempts state contract claims, the only other op-
tion for relief may be filing a copyright infringement claim, which may be
more difficult to prove. 31
B. Desny v. Wilder: Establishing the Implied Contractual Right to
Compensation for Ideas
Desny changed the landscape of entertainment law forever when it held
that writers have property rights in their intangible ideas.32 In Desny, the
plaintiff, Victor Desny, called the office of a producer at Paramount Pictures,
named Billy Wilder, with the hope of selling his movie idea.33 Wilder's sec-
retary answered Desny's phone call, listened to Desny's proposed movie
idea, and found that Desny had a "fantastic unusual story" idea for Wilder.34
Desny notably based his movie idea on the life story of Floyd Collins, a
daring explorer who perished after getting trapped in a deep cave. 35
Desny wanted to submit a script to Wilder, but the secretary informed
Desny that Wilder did not have time to read such a long proposal.36 The
secretary requested that Desny either abbreviate the script into a three or four
page synopsis himself or otherwise submit his story to the studio's script
department to make the same edits.37 Desny decided to edit the script into a
synopsis himself, called Wilder's office back two days later, and told the
secretary it was ready.38 Desny then read the synopsis over the telephone to
the secretary so she could take it down in shorthand and forward the proposal
on to Wilder.39
During the course of the telephone call, Desny told the secretary that
Wilder and Paramount Pictures could only use his story if they compensated
him for "the reasonable value of it."40 The secretary replied that if Wilder or
Paramount used the story, then "naturally we will pay you for it."'4 1 Desny
30. See id. at 375 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. VI).
31. Id.
32. Desny, 299 P.2d at 269.
33. Id. at 261-62.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 262.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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never spoke directly with Wilder, but relied on the secretary's authority to
receive and deliver messages as Wilder's employee and agent. 42
About a year later in the summer of 1950, Desny learned that Wilder
had started shooting a new movie that sounded remarkably similar to the
movie idea that Desny pitched to Wilder's secretary.43 Desny subsequently
called Wilder's secretary and protested the studio's use of his movie idea and
how closely it resembled his synopsis." In the spring of 1951, Paramount
Pictures released the movie, Ace in the Hole, which notably opened to "dis-
appointing ticket sales" and unflattering critical reviews.a5 Nevertheless, on
October 1, 1951, Desny and his attorneys filed a complaint against Wilder
and Paramount Pictures for breach of contract and the "unauthorized use of
dramatic material."46 Desny sought $150,000 in damages to compensate him
for "the reasonable value of his literary property."47 California's recently
amended copyright law did not allow an infringement claim for theft of
Desny's intangible idea, so Desny innovatively claimed that Wilder breached
an implied-in-fact contract that the parties allegedly created when Desny ex-
plicitly conditioned the use of his movie idea on the receipt of reasonable
compensation.48
Prior to 1947, California copyright law provided much broader protec-
tion than federal copyright law.49 California law had previously treated ideas
like protectable property by extending copyright protections to "any product
of the mind," which essentially made ideas protectable property.5 0 However,
in 1947, the California state legislature amended this provision and elimi-
nated copyright protection for "product[s] of the mind."51 Consequently, after
1947, neither California copyright law nor federal copyright law protected
intangible ideas.52 However, the Desny court recognized that California com-
mon law still provided writers with an alternative legal remedy to protect
their ideas. While the Desny court famously declared that "ideas are as free
as the air and as speech and the senses," the court also concluded that writers
42. Id.
43. Eric Hoyt, Writer in the Hole: Desny v. Wilder, Copyright Law, and the Battle
over Ideas, 50 CINEMA J. 21, at 21-24 (2011).
44. Desny, 299 P.2d at 262.
45. Hoyt, supra note 43, at 24.
46. Id. at 25 (citing Complaint, 4:17-19, Oct. 1, 1951).
47. Id. (citing Complaint, 4:17-19, Oct. 1, 1951).
48. See id. at 25-26.
49. Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, I UCLA ENT. L. REV. 9, 16-17
(1994); CAL. CIv. CODE § 980 (West 1947).
50. Id.
51. Sobel, supra note 49, at 17.
52. Id.
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have the right to explicitly condition the use of their ideas under contract
law.53
When comparing Desny's synopsis to an outline of the movie's photo-
play, the court found "a remarkable similarity to [the] plaintiff's story both in
respect to the historical data and the fictional material originated by [the]
plaintiff."54 For example, the protagonist in both the synopsis and the film
had a "fear of the curse of dead Indians," which was a fictional element that
Desny himself created to add dramatic flair to Floyd Collins' story.55 The
Supreme Court of California ultimately reversed the lower court's summary
judgment order and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County so the parties could proceed with trial.56 Five days before the case
was scheduled for trial, Desny settled with Wilder and Paramount Pictures
for the sum of $14,350.57 However, Desny's mark upon the entertainment
industry had now been made as the beginning of the era of idea submission
cases.
Desny now provides California writers the ability to seek legal recourse
under an implied-in-fact contract theory when producers and studios misap-
propriate writers' idea submissions.58 "Desny claims" have emerged as a
term of art, referring exclusively to idea submission cases in Hollywood.59
To establish a Desny claim, a writer must show that he or she "prepared the
work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale . . . and that the offeree
voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was
tendered and the reasonable value of the work."60
Desny also transformed the way studios operate in Hollywood.61 For
example, The Writers Guild of America modified its 1966 Memorandum of
Minimum Basic Agreement to clarify to all parties "that any dealings be-
tween one of their writer members and a television or film producer automat-
ically implies a contract to pay at least the minimum for the material used."62
Similarly, studios have grown increasingly reluctant to accept "unsolicited
53. See Desny, 299 P.2d at 265.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 274, 281 n.10.
56. Id. at 278-79.
57. Hoyt, supra note 43, at 32.
58. Desny, 299 P.2d at 265.
59. Hoyt, supra note 43, at 37.
60. Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967.
61. See Hoyt, supra note 43, at 37-38.
62. Id. at 38 (quoting Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea Ex-
pression Fallacy in a Mass Communication World, 14 UCLA L. REv. 765
(1967) (original emphasis)).
[Vol. XVII
Product of the Mind
submissions" and film treatments from unknown writers.63 Now, to protect
themselves from liability, producers and studios generally refuse to read any
writer's submission that does not contain a signed release.64 Studios gener-
ally require such releases to explicitly state that the studio's review of the
writer's material does not imply an agreement to use or compensate the
writer for any further use of the writer's material.65
C. The Copyright Act Preemption Doctrine
The Copyright Act of 1976 only protects a writer's expression of ideas
when the writer records those expressions in a tangible form.66 The distinc-
tion between tangible and intangible ideas thus creates a dichotomy where
the expression of ideas is clearly protected under copyright law, but the pro-
tection of the ideas themselves must be sought through other means, namely
state contract law.67 The Copyright Act prevents states from supplementing
federal copyright law with their own state copyright laws.68 Under the au-
thority of the Supremacy Clause, section 301 of the Copyright Act states that
the federal Copyright Act preempts all equivalent state law claims.69 Section
301 specifically states that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.. . that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter
of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . are governed exclu-
sively by this title."70 To determine whether the Copyright Act preempts a
state law claim, courts use a two-prong test.7 1
Under this two-prong test, the Copyright Act preempts a state law claim
when (1) the state law claim comes within the scope of the Copyright Act's
subject matter as defined under sections 102 and 103 of the Act, and (2) the
state law claim is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of [federal] copyright [law] as specified by section 106."72 Sections




66. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
67. Samuel M. Bayard, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit Judges, and Movie Scripts,
Oh My!: Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 603, 604-05 (2001).
68. Id. at 608.
69. See id.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (emphasis added).
71. Bayard, supra note 67, at 609.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
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preemption test encompassing "subject matter". 73 These sections collectively
require that an idea must be "fixed in a tangible medium of expression" for
the Copyright Act to apply.74 Section 101 further clarifies, "[a] work is
'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy ...is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration."75 Consequently, federal copyright law does not preempt a state
contract law when a plaintiff-writer's ideas are recorded in a tangible me-
dium.76 The first prong of the section 301 preemption test is typically easily
satisfied, as writers often record their ideas in some form of a tangible
medium.77
The second prong of the section 301 preemption test is more difficult to
satisfy than the first. The "general scope" requirement under the second
prong of the section 301 preemption test is met "when the state law rights
asserted by the plaintiff are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106."78 Section 106
gives the copyright owner "the exclusive rights to do and to authorize" repro-
duction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance, and dis-
play of copyrighted works, and, in the case of sound recordings, digital audio
transmission.79 Therefore, section 301 preempts only those state law claims
that infringe or interfere with the exclusive rights set out in section 106.80
Courts apply the "extra element" test under the second prong of the
section 301 preemption test.8' The extra element test calls for preemption
unless the state law cause of action is "qualitatively different" from a copy-
right infringement claim.82 The extra element test has traditionally consti-
tuted an explicit promise to pay for use of a disclosed idea between a
producer and a screenwriter, which survives preemption.83 The existence of
express contractual promises provides each party rights not covered by fed-
73. Id.; see also Bayard, supra note 67, at 609-10 (describing the two-prong test
from § 301).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
76. Bayard, supra note 67, at 610.
77. Id. at 613.
78. Id. at 612.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
80. Bayard, supra note 67, at 612 (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 612-13.
83. 5-19D MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 19D.03[C][2] (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed.).
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eral copyright law, and thus the necessary "extra element" to avoid preemp-
tion.84 However, courts disagree about what other types of quasi-contractual
claims also avoid preemption by the Copyright Act.85
The second prong is more problematic since courts have diverged in
their application of section 106 and the "general scope" prong of section
301.86 For example, in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the Seventh Circuit held
that section 301 does not preempt contract claims because two-party con-
tracts do not provide for "any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright."87 Thus, the general rule is that a contractual promise qualifies
as an "extra element," even if the defendant breaches the contract by per-
forming an act that section 106 designates exclusively for a copyright
owner. 88 However, a series of cases deviated from the ProCD holding.89 For
instance, in Endemol Entertainment v. Twentieth Television Inc., the district
court found that a "breach of implied contract [claim] does not escape pre-
emption" under section 301 because "ideas,' which are specifically excluded
from Copyright Act protection ... nonetheless fall under the scope of copy-
right subject matter."90 Similarly, in Worth v. Universal Pictures, a California
district court found that federal copyright law preempted the plaintiffs'
breach of implied contract claim when a studio allegedly misappropriated the
plaintiffs' screenplay.91 Likewise, in Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., a Cali-
fornia district court found that the Copyright Act preempted the plaintiffs'
implied contract claim because the implied contract did not protect any right
or extra element beyond what the Copyright Act provided.92 However, this
line of cases supporting preemption essentially became obsolete when the
Ninth Circuit published its decision in Grosso v. Miramax Film
Corporation .93
D. Idea Submission Claims and Copyright Preemption Post-Desny
In the wake of Desny, courts faced increased pressure to clarify the
scope of section 301 and to determine whether the Copyright Act preempted
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See Bayard, supra note 67, at 613.
87. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
88. See Bayard, supra note 67, at 614.
89. See Nimmer, supra note 83, at § 19D.03[C][2].
90. Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television Inc., 1998 WL 785300, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 29,1998) (citing U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the
Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997)).
91. Worth v. Universal Pictures, 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (C.D. Cal.1997).
92. Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
93. Grosso, 383 F.3d at 968.
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implied contract claims. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Grosso v. Miramax
Film Corporation clarified some of these issues.94 The Grosso court held that
the Copyright Act does not preempt the Desny implied contract claims, con-
sequently giving writers an additional means to protect their ideas. 95 This
decision was important because contract claims have longer statute of limita-
tion periods, which gives plaintiffs more time to file their idea theft claims.96
This new development in idea submission law unsurprisingly led to a notice-
able increase in the number of idea theft-related filings in California state
courts.
9 7
However, while the Grosso opinion is important for clarifying the Ninth
Circuit's position on copyright preemption and Desny claims, it spans less
than three pages.98 In another case, Groubert v. Spyglass Entertainment
Group, LP, a California district court further analyzed the relationship be-
tween implied contract claims and federal copyright law, which sheds some
light on why the Copyright Act does not preempt a Desny claim.99 In
Groubert, the plaintiff asserted a copyright infringement claim and a Desny
claim against defendants for allegedly misusing the story idea and written
treatment that the plaintiff had previously pitched to them.0o The Groubert
court notably reached the same conclusion as Grosso by finding that the
Copyright Act of 1976 does not preempt an implied contract claim relating to
an idea submission.101 The court further reasoned that each claim stands on
its own because the contract claim "is not the equivalent to copyright law,
which protects certain forms of expression from unauthorized reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display by anyone."102 Under federal copyright
law, the Groubert court found that the defendants could use the plaintiffs
movie idea without having to compensate the plaintiff "if the idea does not
fall within the protections of the [Copyright] Act."103 Since the plaintiff only
disclosed the idea to the defendants on the condition that he would be com-
pensated if the idea was used, and the defendants accepted this condition,
evidence of an implied contract existed, and thus, constituted "an 'additional
94. See id. at 965.
95. Id. at 968.
96. See Nimmer, supra note 83, at § 19D.03[CI[2].
97. Shannon M. Awsumb, "idea Theft" Claims Post-Grosso, 24 ENT. & SPORTS
LAW. J. 1, 13 (2006).
98. See Grosso, 383 F.3d at 965-68.
99. See Groubert v. Spyglass Entm't Grp., CV 02-01803-SVW JTLX, 2002 WL
2031271, at *2-3(C.D. Cal. July 23, 2002).
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id. at *5.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id.
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element' not covered under copyright law."104 Therefore, the Groubert court
found that because the purpose of the contract was to protect the plaintiff's
rights beyond those covered by federal copyright law, the plaintiffs copy-
right law rights were obviously not equivalent to those found in state contract
law. 105
E. The Actual Use Requirement
Courts have developed the actual use requirement to determine whether
an idea is independently developed or actually used (i.e. producer received
the idea from a writer) for idea submission cases. 106 Actual use can be shown
through direct or circumstantial evidence.107 Since direct evidence of actual
use of an idea is uncommon, most idea theft cases prevail on circumstantial
evidence.'38
In order to meet the actual use requirement through circumstantial evi-
dence, an inference based on access and similarity is made in the substantial
similarity test.1 09 Under the access prong, the plaintiff-writer must demon-
strate that there was a "reasonable possibility" that the defendant was ex-
posed to the plaintiff-writer's idea.10 Under the similarity prong, there must
be some "substantial" similarity between the plaintiff-writer's idea and the
defendant's.' The similarity prong has a low threshold since it turns on
whether a reasonable person would conclude that actual use of an idea oc-
curred. 12 If both access and similarity prongs are met, it may trigger an obli-
gation to pay for the actual use of an idea.1 3
Courts have also adopted a more flexible approach to the actual use
requirement through the "inverse ratio rule"."4 Under the inverse ratio rule, a
lesser evidentiary showing of access to an idea may be compensated by a
greater showing of substantial similarity between the plaintiff-writer's idea
and the defendant's idea, and a lack of similarity may be compensated by a
greater evidentiary showing of access than normally required under the sub-
104. Id.
105. Groubert, 2002 WL 2031271, at *4.
106. Sobel, supra note 49, at 65.
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 68.
111. Id.
112. Sobel, supra note 49, at 68.
113. See id. at 65.
114. Jonathan Richard Sandler, Idea Theft and Independent Creation: A Recipe for
Evading Contractual Obligations, 45 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1427-28
(2012).
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stantial similarity test."15 By using the inverse ratio rule, courts are able to
make an inference of actual use of an idea in an impermissible way when
evidentiary support for one prong is slightly deficient.116
In addition to the inverse ratio rule and the substantial similarity test,
courts also occasionally use the striking similarity test to prove actual use."]7
The striking similarity test requires that the similarities between the plaintiff-
writer's idea and the defendant's idea be "so striking that actual use may be
inferred from those similarities alone, without any evidence of access being
offered."118 The striking similarity test is a high threshold to meet (i.e. simi-
larities can have no other explanation, like independent creation or prior
common source), so courts seldom use this test since such brazen idea theft
rarely occurs." 19
III. CURRENT STATE OF IDEA SUBMISSION LAW
The law of copyright preemption has undergone subtle changes since
Grosso. Historically, six theories have been used to protect ideas: property,
quasi-contract, express contract, implied-in-fact contract, confidential rela-
tionship, and misappropriation.120 However, virtually all idea submission
cases now fall under express contract law or implied-in-fact contract law.121
Desny claims remain viable today, even as courts have started to shift their
focus more towards section 301 and the preemptory effect of the Copyright
Act.122 The Ninth Circuit continues to clarify related issues as demonstrated
by their decisions in Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., which illus-
trates the significance of the substantial similarity test for analyzing preemp-
tion,123 and Montz v. Pilgrim Film & Television, which broadly construes the
extra element test.124 Among other notable developments, other federal cir-
cuits have started to adopt the Grosso holding, as seen in the Second Circuit
decision - Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network.125 The
significance of these decisions will be discussed in more detail below.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1428.
117. Sobel, supra note 49, at 72.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Nimmer, supra note 83, at § 19D.02 (citing Benay, 607 F.3d at 629 (citation
omitted)).
121. Id.
122. Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 976-77.
123. Benay, 607 F.3d at 620.
124. Montz H, 649 F.3d at 975.
125. Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, 683 F.3d 424, 435 (2d
Cir. 2012).
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A. Copyright Preemption in the Ninth Circuit
1. Benay: The Substantial Similarity Test and Copyright
Preemption
In Benay v. Warner Brothers, the Ninth Circuit examined how courts
look at different evidence when evaluating copyright infringement claims
and Desny contract claims.126 In this case, the Benay brothers (plaintiffs)
claimed copyright infringement and breach of an implied contract under Cal-
ifornia law against a production company after the company (defendants)
allegedly breached their implied contractual agreement to compensate the
brothers for use of their screenplay.27 The defendants claimed that they de-
veloped the film independently from the plaintiffs' screenplay and that the
two works did not share substantial similarities.128 The district court agreed
with the defendants and granted summary judgment for the defendants on
both the copyright claim and the contract claim.129 Plaintiffs appealed the
summary judgment rulings.130
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the majority of the similarities
between the company's movie and the brothers' screenplay involved ele-
ments that were not protected, copyrightable material.131 Applying the in-
verse ratio rule, the court further found that there were no substantial
similarities between plaintiffs' protected material and the defendants'
movie.132 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment on the copyright infringement claim in favor of the defendants.133
The court analyzed the validity of the plaintiff s' contract claim separately. 134
The Court recognized that the plaintiffs might be able to show that the
defendants' movie shared substantial similarities to their unprotected ideas
under contract theory.135 The court thus analyzed the degree of similarity
between the screenplay and the film in the context of the contract claim.136
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that "the analysis of similarit[ies] under an im-
plied-in-fact contract claim is different from the analysis of a copyright
claim, even where the plaintiff has submitted a full copyright-protected
126. Benay, 607 F.3d at 624.
127. Id. at 623.
128. Id. at 623, 625.
129. Id. at 623.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 629.
132. Benay, 607 F.3d at 625; see supra Part .E (describing the inverse ratio rule).
133. Id. at 629.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 632.
136. Id. at 630.
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script."37 Therefore, the court reasoned that the similarities between the
screenplay and the film were substantial enough to support a contract claim
even though the copyright infringement claim failed.138 Thus, the plaintiffs'
Desny claim survived preemption by the Copyright Act, and the plaintiffs'
contract claim survived summary judgment since the court was able to con-
sider a broader sampling of evidence to evaluate the validity of that claim.39
The Ninth Circuit court's decision and analysis of the substantial simi-
larity test make Benay significant. The Benay court found that the substantial
similarity test for a Desny claim is not the same as the substantial similarity
test for copyright infringement, which requires proving that actual use of an
idea occurred.140 Courts generally agree that the recipient of an idea is "le-
gally obligated to pay only if the idea was the one actually received from the
plaintiff."14' Actual use of an idea may be proved through direct or circum-
stantial evidence.142 More commonly, the actual use of the plaintiff-writer's
idea is proven with circumstantial evidence contained in the dual elements of
access and similarity through the substantial similarity test.143 To prove ac-
cess, the plaintiff-writer must demonstrate that there was a "reasonable possi-
bility" the defendant knew of the plaintiffs idea, which is usually easier to
prove than similarity.'" The degree of similarity necessary to infer actual use
is different from proving an obligation to pay for an idea.45 The Benay court
examined the substantial similarity requirement for the obligation to pay in
both copyright and breach of implied contract claims.146
For a copyright infringement claim, substantial similarity must be
proved through the "substantial similarity" of copyright-protected ele-
ments. 47 Thus, the Benay court affirmed the notion that a similar idea alone
is not enough for purposes of the substantial similarity test.148 Further, the
court found that finding a claim for copyright infringement under the sub-
stantial similarity test "does not preclude a finding of substantial similarity
for purposes of an implied-in-fact contract under California law."' 149 The
137. Id. at 632.
138. Benay, 607 F.3d at 632.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Sobel, supra note 49, at 65.
142. Id. at 66.
143. Id. at 67.
144. Id. at 68.
145. Id. at 69.
146. See Benay, 607 F.3d at 632.
147. Sobel, supra note 49, at 78.
148. Benay, 607 F.3d at 631.
149. Id.
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Ninth Circuit found that the substantial similarity analysis for a copyright
infringement claim is different from that of a breach of implied contract
claim.150 Unlike a copyright infringement claim, elements that are not copy-
right-protected can be used to show substantial similarity in a contract
claim.151
The major impact of Benay is the additional costs associated with litiga-
tion; litigants may be forced to litigate substantial similarity separately under
a copyright infringement claim and a breach of an implied contract claim.152
To avoid the potential litigation costs, some commentators suggest a nondis-
closure agreement with language addressing which party pays for the ideas in
the subject work and which party has control over the work.153
2. Montz: Defining the Parameters of the Extra Element Test
In Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television ("Montz I"), the Ninth Circuit
held that the Copyright Act did not preempt the writers' claim for breach of
an implied contract or their breach of confidence claim.154 A breach of confi-
dence claim is essentially a breach of fiduciary claim that intends to "protect[
] the duty of trust or confidential relationship between the parties."155 The
Ninth Circuit court applied a more permissive interpretation of the extra ele-
ment test by finding that an implied promise of "a partnership interest in the
proceeds of the production" satisfied the test.156 Consequently, the Montz I1
decision notably expanded the extra element test beyond the simple and
straightforward monetary agreement to include more than a breach of con-
tract claim.157
In Montz, parapsychologist Larry Montz had the idea to create a televi-
sion program that would follow and record the activities of a team of para-
normal investigators while working in the field.58 Montz and his publicist,
Daena Smoller, worked extensively to pitch the idea to studios and producers
150. Id. at 632.
151. Id.
152. Marc J. Rachman & C. Andrew Keisner, The IP You See, and The 1P You
Don't, Portfilio Media, Inc. published by Law 360, 1, 2 (Sept. 2, 2010).
153. Id.
154. Montz H, 649 F.3d at 975.
155. Id. at 981.
156. Montz H, 649 F.3d at 977; see also Michael Palmisciano, Comment, Resur-
recting the Spirit of the Law: Copyright Preemption and Idea Protection in
Montz v. Pilgrim Films, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 209, 210 (2012) (call-
ing the Montz H holding on the extra element test a "permissive
interpretation").
157. Montz H, 649 F.3d at 981.
158. Id. at 977.
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from the years 1996 to 2003.159 The two met with studios and presented
screenplays, videos, and other proposals related to their show idea.160 How-
ever, all the studios indicated to Montz that they were not interested in a
show about paranormal investigators.161 Yet, one of the studios later
partnered with Craig Piligian, and Pilgrim Films, to produce the television
series Ghost Hunters, which followed a team of paranormal investigators
across the country.162 Montz and Smoller subsequently filed a lawsuit against
Piligian and Pilgrim Films alleging several claims, including: copyright in-
fringement, breach of implied contract, and breach of writers' confidence
among other actions.163 The district court, however, entered judgment to dis-
miss the plaintiffs' claims on the basis that the federal Copyright Act pre-
empted the breach of contract claim and breach of confidence claims.164 The
plaintiffs subsequently appealed.165
On appeal, Montz argued that the Copyright Act did not preempt his
implied contract and breach of confidence claims because the rights asserted
in those claims were not equivalent to the rights provided to him under copy-
right law. 166 However, the Montz Ijustices ruled that "[t]he gravamen of the
claim is that the defendants used the plaintiffs' work, without authorization,
to create (and then profit from) a new television program," and that "[t]he
rights asserted by the plaintiffs under the implied contract are thus equivalent
to the rights of copyright owners under § 106."167 The Montz I justices af-
firmed the district court's ruling against the plaintiff.168 However, the court,
by majority vote of the Ninth Circuit justices, later ordered an en banc re-
hearing of the case. 169
After the en banc rehearing, the Montz II court reversed and remanded
the previous panel's decision from Montz J.17° The split in the rulings be-
tween Montz 1 and Montz II represents the challenge that the extra element
test presents to the courts. 71 According to the Montz II court, an implied
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 977.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 978.
165. Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 606 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010)
[hereinafter Montz I]; Montz H, 649 F.3d at 978.
166. Montz 1, 606 F.3d at 1157-58.
167. Id. at 1157.
168. Id. at 1160.
169. Montz H, 649 F.3d at 978.
170. Id. at 980-81.
171. See Palmisciano, supra note 156, at 216-17.
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contract claim must allege (1) the plaintiff disclosed that their idea was for
sale; (2) the plaintiff expected to be reasonably compensated for sharing that
idea; and (3) the defendant knew the conditions on which the idea was of-
fered.172 Moreover, to survive preemption, the contract claim must still con-
tain an extra element which makes the nature of the claim qualitatively
different from a copyright claim.173 While courts traditionally interpreted this
additional element as a "bilateral understanding of payment" made in a con-
tractual agreement, the Montz II court applied a decidedly permissive inter-
pretation of the extra element test. 174 Specifically, the Montz II court found
that a breach of confidence claim, as a non-contract claim, was "qualitatively
different from a copyright claim," and therefore, satisfied the extra element
test.175 The court considered the parties' "confidential relationship" to consti-
tute the extra element. 76
Four judges, however, vehemently disagreed with the Montz II major-
ity's permissive interpretation of the extra element test.177 Judge
O'Scannlain, writing on behalf of the dissenting justices, argued "an action to
enforce a promise not to use or to disclose ideas embodied in copyrighted
material without authorization asserts rights [that are] equivalent to those
protected by the Copyright Act."178 Relying on the theory that a copyright
gives the owner the right to exclusively control the work and exclude others
from using it, the dissent argued that the studio merely "promised (implicitly)
to respect Montz's rights to the production, distribution, and broadcast of his
work. Put differently, [the studio] promised to respect the rights afforded to
Montz by the Copyright Act."' 79 Therefore, Judge O'Scannlain argued that
the majority incorrectly found that the breach constituted an extra element,
when in reality the only agreement between the parties was to respect the
plaintiffs rights under copyright law.180
While the majority in Montz H broadly construed the extra element test
under the second prong of the Section 301 preemption analysis, the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion in Montz H is incorrect because this permissive interpre-
tation of the extra element infringes on the rights afforded by the Copyright
Act of 1976. Prior to Montz H, the Ninth Circuit had narrowly defined this
172. See Montz II, 649 F.3d at 981.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 976-77.
175. Id. at 981.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 981 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
178. Montz II, 649 F.3d at 982-84 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 982 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 983-84 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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extra element as a bilateral expectation to monetary compensation.181 By
challenging Montz I, Montz II wrongly expanded the definitional parameters
for what constitutes an extra element.
The extra element test has been problematic since Judge Leisure ruled
that the extra element must change "the nature of the action so that it is
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim" in Mayer v.
Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd.182 The Grosso court promulgated that the
traditional interpretation of the extra element test is that it is the "existence of
an actual agreement between plaintiff and defendant involving a promise to
pay for use of disclosed ideas."I83 The Montz I court correctly ruled that the
breach of confidence claim, as a non-contractual agreement, did not consti-
tute an extra element.184 In adhering to the traditional, narrow interpretation
of the extra element test, the Montz I court properly recognized that the plain-
tiff's claim was "equivalent to the rights of copyright owners under § 106-
namely, the exclusive rights to use and to authorize use of their work."85
The Montz H majority opinion sparked a strong dissent led by Judge
O'Scannlain and joined by Judges Gould, Tallman, and Bea.186 Judge
O'Scannlain rejected this permissive interpretation of the extra element test
and argued that Montz's claim was not qualitatively different from the rights
afforded under the Copyright Act.187 He argued that the majority simply
failed to distinguish Montz's "implied promise that Pilgrim would not use the
ideas embodied in his materials without his consent" from a claim to sell "the
rights to the ideas embodied in his materials" as in Grosso.188 The distinction
Judge O'Scannlain makes centers on the authorization to distribute rather
than merely an offer to pay for an idea. Section 106 of the Copyright Act
covers authorization to distribute,189 which supports Judge O'Scannlain's
opinion, and clearly places Montz's claim outside the scope of the extra ele-
ment test since there is no qualitative difference. In a separate dissent, Judge
181. Id. at 977; see Benay, 607 F.3d at 629.
182. Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An
"Idea" Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 756 (2006) (quoting
Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
183. See 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,-19D NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 19D.03[C][2] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2013) (citing Wrench L.L.C. v. Taco
Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1114
(2002)); see also Grosso, v. Miramax Film Corp. 383 F.3d at 965, 968 (9th Cir.
2004), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 400 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2005).
184. Montz 1, 606 F.3d at 1158.
185. Id.
186. Montz 1I, 649 F.3d. at 981 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 982 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 983-84 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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Gould noted that the claim on the authorization to distribute the work was
functionally the same as one of the rights afforded under copyright law-the
authorization to distribute.190 Additionally, he stated that that majority hold-
ing would be problematic since "film production and network companies
face the chaotic prospect of having to meet conflicting federal and state stan-
dards on essentially the same question, a result the Copyright Act aimed to
avoid."191
The Montz H defendant petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States,192 which is unsurprising in light of the strong dissents in
Montz II and the conflict between Montz I and Montz H. However, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari,193 which left this permissive interpretation in
place in the Ninth Circuit. Montz H leaves a problematic legacy given the
different definitional parameters of the extra element test, such as those es-
tablished in Montz II and Benay. As idea submission cases increase outside
the Ninth Circuit, courts will have little guidance from the Ninth Circuit in
properly construing the test. This opens the door for a future circuit split on
the extra element test with some circuits potentially adopting the narrow in-
terpretation of the extra element test while others will mistakenly follow the
permissive interpretation in Montz H.
B. The Second Circuit Aligns with the Ninth Circuit on Copyright
Preemption
In Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network,194 the Second
Circuit recently held that the Copyright Act did not preempt a breach of
implied contract claim in an idea submission case. 195 However, the Second
Circuit's decision in Forest Park was somewhat unexpected. Based on the
Second Circuit's prior decisions holding that the Copyright Act preempted
certain quasi-contract claims,9 6 commentators also believed that the Second
190. Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 986 (Gould, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting).
192. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc. v. Montz, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011) (denying
certiorari).
193. Id.
194. 683 F.3d 424 (2d Cir. 2012).
195. Id. at 433; see also Marc J. Rachman & C. Andrew Keisner, Case Study: For-
est Park Pictures v. Universal Television, PORTFOLIO MEDIA, INC. DAVIS &
GILBERT LLP (July 9, 2012 2:38 PM), http://www.dglaw.com/images-userf
newsalerts/Rachman.Keisner.Law360.Forest.Park.Pictures.V.Universal.Televi-
sion.July.9.2012.pdf.
196. See, e.g., Briarpatch, L.P. v. Phx. Pictures Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that the Copyright Act preempted an unjust enrichment claim);
Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that the Copyright Act preempted an idea misappropriation
claim claim); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
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Circuit would find that the Copyright Act preempted breach of implied con-
tract claims.197 However, the Second Circuit ruling followed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's lead to allow writers the limited ability to file idea submission claims
under state contract law.198
1. Forest Park: Manhattan Follows Hollywood
In Forest Park, plaintiffs Forest Park Pictures, Hayden Christensen, and
Tove Christensen (collectively, "Forest Park"), developed an idea for a tele-
vision program where the protagonist would work as a "concierge" doctor for
the wealthy in Malibu after being ostracized from the medical community.199
Forest Park plaintiffs created a written treatment for the television series and
mailed the treatment to USA Network.200 Subsequently, Forest Park and
USA Network representatives met to discuss the treatment with the under-
standing that USA Network would compensate Forest Park if the network
commercially developed the idea.201 During the pitch meeting, USA Network
representatives admitted they had never heard of "concierge" doctors, and,
while they found the idea intriguing, communication between the parties
soon ceased.202 However, about four years later, USA Network aired a show
entitled Royal Pains, which was about a "concierge" doctor who worked in
the Hamptons.03 Forest Park sued for breach of an implied contract, based
on USA Network's implied promise to compensate Forest Park for the use of
their idea.204
In Forest Park, the court evaluated the plaintiffs' claims regarding: (1)
whether the Copyright Act preempted the plaintiffs' breach of implied con-
tract claim, and (2) whether the plaintiffs properly plead their claim under
California state law.205 The Second Circuit examined Forest Park's breach of
implied contract claim under the two-prong section 301 preemption test.206
Under the first subject matter prong, the court affirmed the broad interpreta-
tion that "works may fall within the subject matter of copyright, and thus be
subject to preemption, even if they contain material that is uncopyrightable
200 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Copyright Act preempted a conversion
claim), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
197. Rachman & Keisner, supra note 195.
198. Id.





204. Id. at 428-29.
205. Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 429.
206. See id. at 429-33.
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under section 102."207 The court noted that "the scope of copyright for pre-
emption purposes ... extends beyond the scope of available copyright pro-
tection."208 The Second Circuit ultimately held that the Copyright Act is so
broad that plaintiffs' ideas fell within the subject matter requirement even
though USA Network never physically acquired them, which satisfied this
prong of the preemption test.2 09
Under the second prong of the preemption test, the Forest Park court
examined whether the state contract claim was equivalent to one of the ex-
clusive rights provided under copyright law.210 Similar to the courts in Benay
and Montz, the Second Circuit applied the extra element test.2" Prior to this
decision, the Second Circuit court had notably held that the Copyright Act
does not preempt numerous other claims, including misappropriation claims,
trade secret claims, and breach of confidential relationship claims.212 How-
ever, the Second Circuit had also previously held that a state law claim is
"preempted when the extra element changes the scope but not the fundamen-
tal nature of the right" in cases concerning unjust enrichment, misappropria-
tion, and conversion.13 In Forest Park, the Second Circuit ultimately
determined that there were several qualitative differences between an implied
contract claim under state law and a copyright violation claim under federal
law.214 Therefore, the court ruled that the Copyright Act did not preempt
Forest Park's contract claim.215
The Second Circuit further held that there is no difference, for purposes
of Section 301 preemption analysis, between express contracts and implied-
in-fact contracts. 21 6 However, the court argued that there is a significant dif-
ference between implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts.217 In implied-
in-fact contract cases, courts traditionally find the parties' actual agreement
to be the extra element of the contract claim that distinguishes it from a
copyright claim.218 In an implied-in-law contract, the plaintiff does not need
to prove the existence of any actual agreement between the parties.219 Based
207. Id. at 429-30.
208. Id. at 429-30.
209. Id. at 430.
210. Id.
211. Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 430-31, 435.
212. Id. at 430-31.
213. Id. at 431.
214. Id. at 431-32.
215. Id. at 432-33.
216. Id. at 432.
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on this distinction, the court held that implied-in-law contracts do not have
this "extra element" and are therefore preempted by the Copyright Act.220
In Forest Park, it is important to note that the Second Circuit applied
California law instead of New York law when it evaluated the validity of the
parties' implied-in-fact contract claim.221 This may have affected the out-
come of the case since the court found a conflict between the enforceability
of a contract under California law, which states that an open price term can
be filled in by industry standard, and New York law, which is murky about
the legality of "gap fillers" in implied-in-fact contract claims.222
In sum, the Forest Park court further supported the viability of Desny
claims for idea submission cases. 223 While Forest Park did not expressly con-
dition disclosure of its pitch on the expectation of payment, it pitched the
idea to USA Network with the expectation that the network would compen-
sate it if the network used its idea.224 The parties also implicitly understood
that USA Network knew that the standard in the entertainment industry was
to compensate individuals for the use of their ideas.225 The Forest Park court
ultimately found that there was an enforceable implied-in-fact contract, and
the contract claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act.226 Therefore, the
Second Circuit held that the district court incorrectly dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint, and vacated and remanded for further review.227
With Forest Park, the Second Circuit aligned itself with the Ninth Cir-
cuit by finding that the Copyright Act did not preempt a claim for breach of
an implied contract in the area of idea submission.228 This decision surprised
some commentators who believed that the Second Circuit would conclude
differently based on its previous rulings that certain quasi-contract claims
were preempted. 229 For instance, in Briarpatch v. Phoenix Pictures, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that a claim of unjust enrichment was preempted by the
Copyright Act when plaintiff Briarpatch sought to protect its adaptation in-
terests in The Thin Red Line, a novel and screenplay, which was later adapted
to film.230 Under New York law, the basic elements of an unjust enrichment
220. Id.
221. Id. at 434.
222. Id. at 433-34.
223. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 435.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 436.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 427-28; Benay, 607 F.3d at 629, 632; see also Montz H, 649 F.3d at
977.
229. See Rachman & Keisner, supra note 195, at 1-2.
230. Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 300, 306.
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claim require proof that the defendant was enriched at the plaintiff's expense,
and equity and good conscience weigh against allowing the defendant to
keep what the plaintiff is seeking to recover. 23 1 In Briarpatch, the act of turn-
ing the novel and screenplay into a motion picture infringed on the adapta-
tion rights belonging to the plaintiff, therefore meeting the second and third
elements of the unjust enrichment test.2 32 However, under the first element of
the unjust enrichment claim, the Second Circuit found in favor of the defend-
ants by stating that "[w]hile enrichment is not required for copyright in-
fringement, we do not believe that it goes far enough to make the unjust
enrichment claim qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim."233
The Second Circuit adhered to this stance on preemption in Moody's
Investors and Harper & Row Publishers.234 In Financial Information, the
court found that a claim for idea misappropriation was preempted by the
Copyright Act because "state law claims that rely on the misappropriation
branch of unfair competition are preempted."235 Similarly, in Harper & Row,
the Second Circuit ruled the Copyright Act preempted the plaintiff's conver-
sion claim based on the unauthorized publication of an article because the
right to control reproduction and derivative use of the copyrighted material
was already protected under federal copyright law.236 However, the Second
Circuit took care to distinguish its prior decisions concerning copyright pre-
emption of quasi-contracts from the claim in Forest Park by noting that prior
claims concerned implied-in-law contracts, whereas Forest Park hinged on
an implied-in-fact contract. 237
The Forest Park court explained that there is "a significant difference
for preemption purposes between contracts implied-in-fact and contracts im-
plied-in-law." 238 Whereas an implied-in-law contract is "fictitious" because it
is not based on an existence of an explicit agreement between the parties, an
implied-in-fact contract is a "true contract that arises from the tacit agree-
ment between the two parties" which contains the extra element of bargain-
231. Id. at 306.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. See Moody's Investors, 808 F.2d at 208 (holding that the Copyright Act
preempts idea misappropriation claim); Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 201 (hold-
ing that the Copyright Act preempts conversion claim).
235. Moody's Investors, 808 F.2d at 208 (citing Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co.,
720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir. 1983)).
236. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 201.
237. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 430-32.
238. Id. at 432 (citing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 1-1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.20 (Jo-
seph M. Perillo ed., 1993)).
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ing between the parties239 It is this extra element that makes an implied-in-
fact contract qualitatively different from the claim asserted under copyright
law.240 For instance, in Muller v. Andersen, the Second Circuit applied Forest
Park to a screenwriter's claim that defendants illegally used the plaintiff's
script in the film, Alien v. Predator.2 41 The court found that the defendants
violated an implied-in-fact contract by using Muller's script without remu-
neration, and, therefore, the breach of implied contract claim was not pre-
empted by the Copyright Act. 242
The Forest Park decision further deviated from some district court rul-
ings in the Second Circuit that ruled differently on the issue of preemption.43
In an unpublished hearing transcript for O'Keefe v. Ogilvy & Mather World-
wide, Inc., the District Court of the Southern District of New York found that
a breach of an implied contract was not preempted because it met the extra
element requirement.244 On the other hand, prior to Forest Park, the Second
Circuit found that the Copyright Act preempted state law claims of idea mis-
appropriation and idea appropriation in A Slice of Pie Productions, LLC v.
Wayans Brothers Entertainment.45 The district court found guidance in
Briarpatch by holding that "the preemption provisions of the Copyright Act
apply to state law claims seeking protection of equivalent rights, whether or
not the plaintiff has contemporaneously asserted a copyright infringement
claim."246 Thus, the Forest Park court took a step in the opposite direction on
preemption concerning implied-in-fact contracts from its prior decisions in
Briarpatch and A Slice of Pie.247
In stark contrast to Montz H, the Forest Park court did not address the
definitional parameters of the extra element test.248 Whereas the Ninth Circuit
in Montz II opted for a decidedly permissive interpretation of the extra ele-
ment test, the Forest Park court glossed over it.249 As a result, the Second
Circuit could ultimately adopt a permissive interpretation of the extra ele-
239. Id.
240. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 433.
241. Muller v. Anderson, 501 F. App'x 81, 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2012).
242. Id. at 84.
243. Rachman & Keisner, supra note 195, at 2.
244. Id.
245. See A Slice of Pie Prod., LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entm't, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297,
316 (D. Conn. 2005).
246. Id. (citing Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306-07).
247. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 432.
248. See id.
249. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 424; Montz //, 649 F.3d at 975.
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ment test when a case challenging the test's definitional parameters comes
before the court.250
As the entertainment industry flourishes in New York, the Second Cir-
cuit will certainly experience a rise in idea submission cases because of For-
est Park.251 The Forest Park decision notably did not address the definitional
parameters of the extra element test. However, Forest Park demonstrates that
the Second Circuit will likely follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in idea
submission cases. Unaddressed issues from Forest Park will likely be de-
cided in the future as the number of copyright preemption cases in idea sub-
mission rise in the Second Circuit.252
IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN IDEA SUBMISSION LAW
The area of idea submission law has continued to develop since Desny
and will continue to grow as long as television and movies remain popular.
While the Second and Ninth Circuits have addressed this area of the law, the
U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on any idea submission cases. The next
section addresses the future of this emerging area of law.
A. The Supreme Court on Copyright Preemption and Idea
Submission Law
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether the Copyright Act
preempts state law claims in idea submission cases. The Ninth Circuit in
Grosso, Benay, and Montz II, and the Second Circuit in Forest Park, demon-
strate that courts generally disapprove of preemption. The courts that have
addressed preemption all seem to agree that Desny claims provide qualita-
tively different rights than those afforded under federal copyright law.253 The
major question for the Supreme Court is the scope of the extra element test,
i.e., whether the extra element test only implicates breach of contract or if it
considers other claims, such as breach of confidence.254 Cases such as Benay
were silent regarding whether the extra element test applies to anything more
than "bilateral expectation of compensation" contract claims.255 However, the
Montz I and Montz H cases demonstrated that the courts are in serious con-
flict as to whether the extra element test could also be broadly construed to
include non-monetary compensation claims, like a breach of confidence
claim.256
250. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 432.
251. See Rachman & Keisner, supra note 195, at 2.
252. See id. (citing Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 434).
253. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 424; Montz I, 649 F.3d at 975; Benay, 607 F.3d
at 620; Montz I, 606 F.3d at 1153.
254. See Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 981.
255. See Benay, 607 F.3d at 632.
256. See Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 975, 981.
2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
In 2011, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the extra
element test under the second prong of the Section 301 preemption test when
defendant Pilgrim Films petitioned the Court for certiorari review in Montz
HJ.257 However, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.258 Considering the high
level of conflict between the Montz I and Montz H opinions, the strong dis-
sent of Justice O'Scannlain in Montz H, and the possibility of similar cases
arising in the future, it would have been prudent for the Court to grant certio-
rari and give the courts more guidance on the scope of the "extra element"
test.
When the Supreme Court ultimately grants certiorari on this issue, the
Court should follow Montz I and hold that the extra element test is narrowly
construed, and consequently preempted by the Copyright Act, in order to
properly distinguish state claims from the rights afforded under copyright
law. The extra element test involves contract claims, which afford signifi-
cantly different rights than copyright claims.259 However, breach of confi-
dence claims and other similar claims relating to idea theft do not provide for
functionally different rights than those under copyright law. By expanding
the definitional parameters of the extra element test to include non-monetary
compensation, the Ninth Circuit and other courts will continue to confuse
these preemption issues until the Supreme Court provides guidance.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of copyright protection, the "law of ideas" has become
increasingly complex. 260 Since Desny, studios have shied away from ac-
cepting unsolicited manuscripts and film treatments, due to the fear of inad-
vertently establishing an implied contract with writers. However, such
safeguards have neither eradicated Desny claims nor simplified the law sur-
rounding idea submission cases. The Grosso decision clarified questions sur-
rounding idea submission law on the issue of whether the Copyright Act
preempts Desny claims.261 Following Grosso, there has been a noticeable in-
crease in the number of idea submission cases, as litigants now have the
advantage of asserting dual claims of breach of implied contract and copy-
right infringement.
In recent years, however, there has been a shift away from traditional
Desny claims and a new focus on copyright preemption, particularly the sec-
tion 301 extra element test. Most of these cases originate in the Ninth Circuit
257. See Pilgrim Films, 132 S. Ct. 550 (2011).
258. See id.
259. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 424.
260. See Sobel, supra note 49, at 12 (stating that idea submission law is also known
as the "law of ideas").
261. See Grosso, 383 F.3d at 965.
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and California district courts. However, the Second Circuit, as seen in Forest
Park, has also considered idea submission cases.2 62
In the Ninth Circuit, the Benay court found that the substantial similarity
test for a breach of an implied contract claim is not the same for a copyright
infringement claim, which potentially increases litigation costs for the par-
ties.263 However, Montz I and Montz H, which transformed the extra element
test, overshadow Benay. Prior to Montz II, courts had narrowly construed the
extra element test to include only those claims involving a bilateral expecta-
tion of monetary compensation.64
The en banc decision in Montz II erroneously adopted a permissive in-
terpretation of the extra element test by holding that it encompassed a non-
monetary agreement, namely the promise not to use or disclose plaintiff's
ideas without consent.265 However, the Montz II majority seemed to ignore
the sound reasoning of the dissent, led by Judge O'Scannlain. Judge
O'Scannlain correctly argued that a promise not to disclose ideas without
consent cannot constitute an extra element because it is equivalent to Section
106 of the Copyright Act, which covers the production and distribution of
copyrighted works.2 66
Unsurprisingly, the Montz II defendant, Pilgrim Films, petitioned the
Supreme Court to review the case to decide the definitional parameters of the
extra element test.267 However, the Supreme Court mistakenly denied certio-
rari.268 If the Supreme Court had granted review on this issue, then it would
have had the opportunity to overturn Montz H and correctly conclude that the
extra element test needs to be defined narrowly and not intrude on the rights
afforded under the Copyright Act of 1976. Clearly, the conclusion in Montz
II opens the door for a circuit split between the Second and Ninth Circuits, as
courts struggle to define what exactly constitutes an "extra element."
As the entertainment industry continues to explode, idea submission law
will continue to grow, from Hollywood to Manhattan. However, there are
glaring deficiencies in this area of the law since it has been addressed only
through state law. The Supreme Court has never heard an idea submission
case. The real test for the Court will be ruling on the definitional parameters
of the extra element test. The Ninth Circuit conflict between Montz I and
Montz II presents a unique opportunity for the Supreme Court to finally ad-
dress idea submission law, since the Montz II majority did not properly dis-
tinguish claims for authorization to distribute from claims for the exclusive
262. See Forest Park, 683 F.3d at 428.
263. See Benay, 607 F.3d at 632.
264. See id. at 629.
265. See Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 981-82.
266. See id. at 983 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
267. See Pilgrim Films, 132 S. Ct. at 550.
268. See id.
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right to use and authorize use of a work under Section 106 of the Copyright
Act.269
In the coming years, the area of idea submission law will continue to
develop because ideas continue to drive innovation. While the law of idea
seems complex and intricate at times, this is only because it exists primarily
through federal circuits, which have established their own body of case law.
Courts need Supreme Court guidance to provide clarification on emerging
points of conflict in idea submission cases.
269. See Montz 11, 649 F.3d at 982 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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